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A LITTLE COLOR IN A WORLD OF GRAY: THE
SURVIVAL OF CUSTOMS' COMMON CONTROL
EXCEPTION IN THE GRAY MARKET
Section 526 of the Tariff Act of 19301 and section 42 of the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act2 generally prohibit importation of gray market goods. Gray
market goods are goods that are produced abroad under a certain trademark,
imported into the United States, and sold in competition with goods bearing
an identical or similar United States registered trademark.' While the Tariff
Act and the Lanham Act generally prohibit importation of gray market
goods, the United States Customs Service (Customs) has implemented re-
gulations that lift this prohibition whenever the foreign and domestic trade-
mark owners are parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject
to common ownership or control. 4 These regulations are known as the
common control exception.
5
Courts have debated the validity of the common control exception with
mixed results. 6 The United States Supreme Court recently has upheld the
common control exception under section 526 of the Tariff Act.7 The Second,
Third, and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of Appeals, however, have
disagreed on the validity of the common control exception under section 42
of the Lanham Act.8 As currently written and enforced, the common control
1. Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 590, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1988) (originally enacted as Act
of Sept. 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858, repealed and reenacted as Tariff Act of 1930, ch.
497, § 526, 46 Stat. 590 (1930)).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988) (originally enacted as Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592,
§ 27, 33 Stat. 724 (1905), reenacted as Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946),
codified as Amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-72, 1091-06, 1111-21, 1123-27).
3. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing gray
market goods as products legitimately sold abroad under certain trademark, imported into
United States, and sold in competition with goods bearing identical United States registered
trademark); Olympus Corp. v. United States, 627 F. Supp. 911, 913 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (defining
gray market goods as those goods produced abroad, bearing a foreign trademark, and imported
by person other than authorized dealer); see generally, Note, Trademark Law: The Wacky
World of Grey Market Goods: Untangling the Knot the Customs Regulations Tie Around
Section 526 of the Tariff Act, 40 U. FLA. L. Ray. 433, 444-48 (1988) (explaining background
and holdings of Vivitar and Olympus); The Gray Market Controversy and the Court: An
Analysis of Conflicting Court of Appeals Decisions on the Validity of Customs Regulations
Permitting Unauthorized Third Party Importation of Trademarked Goods, 18 SETON HALL L.
REv. 55, 76-85 (1988) (discussing analyses and holdings of Vivitar and Olympus).
4. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1989) (mirroring § 526 of Tariff Act and § 42 of Lanham Act
by prohibiting importation of goods that bear marks which copy or simulate United States
registered marks).
5. Id.
6. See infra notes 28-32, 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing courts' position on
validity of common control exception).
7. KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
8. Compare Weil Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir. 1989)
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exception only serves a legitimate purpose in certain situations.9 If the gray
market good is identical and if the domestic affiliate actually has control
over the foreign company's production, distribution, and servicing of the
gray market goods, the current common control exception correctly allows
importation of the gray market goods.10 The common control exception
does not further the goals of trademark law by allowing importation of
gray market goods if the affiliated foreign and domestic companies actually
cannot control the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of these
products."
The common control exception is the most expansive exception to the
general prohibition against importation of gray market goods.1 2 Customs
currently allows importation of goods under the "same owner" exception
if the same person or business entity owns the foreign and domestic
trademarks. 3 The common control exception encompasses this same owner
exception and expands the same owner exception by permitting importation
of goods if the foreign and domestic trademark owners are parent and
subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common ownership or
control. 4 The regulations define "common ownership" as "individual or
aggregate ownership of more than 50 percent of the business entity. '" '
Customs then defines "common control" to be "effective control in policy
and operations and ... not necessarily synonymous with common owner-
ship. ' 1 6 The regulations consequently give an objective standard to Customs
officials for determining whether an exception applies to common ownership
of a business, 7 and customs officials and courts have had little difficulty
(holding that § 42 is no bar to importation of genuine gray market goods) and Olympus Corp.
v. United States, 792 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding common control exception under
§ 42) with Lever Bros. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (invalidating common
control exception under § 42).
9. See infra notes 124-45 and accompanying text (discussing limitations of current
common control exception).
10. See infra notes 87-93 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which current
common control exception allows importation of gray market goods).
11. See infra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (describing common control exception's
relationship to goals of trademark law).
12. See infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text (discussing definition and scope of
Customs' common control exception).
13. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1) (1989).
14. Id. § 133.21(c)(2).
15. Id. § 133.2(d)(1).
16. Id. § 133.2(d)(2).
17. See Note, Trademark Law: The Wacky World of Gray Market Goods, 40 UNIv. oF
FA. L. Ray. 442-44 (1988) (detailing history of Customs regulations); Coalition to Preserve
the Integrity of American Trademarks (COPIAT) v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 913-16 (D.C.
Cir. 1986) (reviewing history of common control exception). Customs' common control
exception has existed in its present form since 1972. Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d
1552, 1566-68 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Before the current regulations, Customs officials could allow
importation of gray market goods only if the same person, partnership, association, or
corporation owned the domestic and foreign trademarks. 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1959), T.D.
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determining if two companies are subject to common ownership in deciding
whether to permit importation of the company's gray market goods.' 8 A
more subjective determination of whether two companies are subject to
common control leads to inconsistencies in the application of the common
control exception.' 9
In formulating the current common control exception, Customs relied
on the theory that the domestic arm of an international business could
control the quality and marking of foreign gray market goods, even if the
foreign firm owned or controlled the domestic subsidiary.2 According to
Customs, the domestic trademark holder does not need protection against
identical or similar United States registered trademarks that a parent or
subsidiary company within its common control imports because the same
individuals receive the profits and decide the policy of the related compa-
nies. 2' Courts often have followed this reasoning.?
In KMart v. Cartier3 several courts dealt with a direct challenge to the
validity of the common control exception.7 In KMart an association of
American trademark owners2n sought a declaratory judgment invalidating
the common control exception and argued that the exception conflicted with
section 526 of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham Act.2 6 The
association contended that the Tariff and Lanham Acts gave domestic
trademark owners an exclusive right to prohibit the importation of goods
that their subsidiaries manufactured and that third parties imported into
the United States without their consent.27 The association argued that even
54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 433, 433-34 (1959). The pre-1972 regulations reflected the
legislative and judicial directives of promoting competition while also protecting American
companies. See 62 CONG. REc. 11,602-05 (1922) (debating and passing predecessor of § 526
of Tariff Act of 1930).
18. See infra notes 29-33, 46-50 and accompanying text (dealing exclusively with common
control question).
19. See infra notes 81-93 and accompanying text (discussing inconsistencies in applying
common control exception to multinational corporations and nonidentical goods).
20. Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United
States Bureau of Customs, 59 TRaDEKARK REP. 301, 308 (1969).
21. Id.
22. See supra notes 19-41 and accompanying text (explaining Supreme Court's validation
of common control exception under § 526 of Tariff Act). See generally Weicher, KMart Corp.
v. Cartier, Inc.: A Black Decision for the Gray Market, 38 AM. U.L. REv. 463, 477-89 (1989)
(discussing history and decision of KMart and concluding that Supreme Court's decision harms
consumers and domestic trademark owners by allowing gray market imports).
23. 486 U.S. 281 (1988).
24. KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 285 (1988).
25. See COPIAT v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844, 846 (D.D.C. 1984), rev'd in part,
790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., KMart v. Cartier,
486 U.S. 281 (1988) (explaining membership in Coalition to Preserve Integrity of American
Trademarks (COPIAT) consisted of manufacturers or distributors with registered United States
trademarks). COPIAT, the association of trademark owners that brought suit against KMart
in KMart v. Cartier, is now inactive. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AsSOCIATIONS 2489, No. 3 (1989).
26. KMart, 486 U.S. at 291-92.
27. COPIAT, 598 F. Supp. at 846.
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if the gray market goods bore authentic trademarks, Customs should exclude
the goods unless the domestic trademark owners consented.2
Finding the association's arguments unpersuasive, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia upheld the common control
exception. 29 The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the district court's decision, holding that the language of section
526 contains no exceptions to the ban on importation based upon a
trademark owner's corporate relationship. 0 The Court of Appeals' decision
caused a split among the circuit courts regarding the validity of the common
control exception under section 526 of the Tariff Act. The Federal' and
Second Circuits32 recently had affirmed the validity of the common control
exception under section 526 of the Tariff Act, deferring to Customs' long-
standing interpretation and enforcement of the Tariff Act. To remedy this
split in the circuits, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
33
In determining whether the common control exception is valid under
section 526, the Supreme Court in KMart examined the language of section
526. 34 The Court found two ambiguous phrases in the language of section
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. COPIAT v. United States, 790 F.2d 903, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
31. Vivitar v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The Federal Circuit
in Vivitar considered whether § 526 of the Tariff Act requires Customs to exclude all imports
bearing a domestic owner's trademark that enter Customs without the written consent of the
owner. Id. at 1555. In Vivitar the Vivitar Corporation argued that § 526 gives domestic
trademark owners the exclusive right to require Customs to prevent importation of gray market
goods and that the common control exception is invalid. Id. at 1555. The Federal Circuit
affirmed the Court of International Trade's decision that upheld the common control exception
as valid under § 526, and the Federal Circuit found that the common control exception is a
reasonable exercise of Customs' power under § 526 of the Tariff Act as a matter of agency
enforcement. Id. at 1555-56. The Federal Circuit recognized the wide variety of gray market
situations and decided that Customs is not required to provide for automatic exclusion beyond
the exclusion expressed in its regulations. Id. at 1570. According to the Federal Circuit,
Customs can allow importation of the gray market good and leave the initial determination
of infringement under the common control exception to the court. Id.
32. Olympus v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1986) (aff'g 627 F. Supp.
911 (E.D.N.Y. 1985)). The Second Circuit in Olympus considered whether Customs' common
control exception violated § 526 of the Tariff Act and § 42 of the Lanham Act. Id. at 316-
17. In Olympus the Olympus Corporation attempted to prohibit Customs from allowing
importation of goods bearing the Olympus trademark into the United States because third
parties were importing these goods. Olympus, 627 F. Supp. at 913. The District Court for the
Eastern District of New York found that the common control exception does not violate § 526
of the Tariff Act or § 42 of the Lanham Act because neither statute expressly prohibits
importation by third parties of goods bearing an authorized trademark. Id. at 920-21. The
Second Circuit affirmed, finding that the consistent policy of Customs in enforcing the common
control exception warranted deference. Olympus, 792 F.2d at 319-20. According to the Second
Circuit, Customs would face difficulties in making at-the-border determinations of whether a
domestic company has developed independent goodwill without the common control exception.
Id. at 320. Thus, the Second Circuit upheld the common control exception under § 526 of the
Tariff Act and § 42 of the Lanham Act. Id. at 319-21.
33. KMart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 290-91.
34. Id. at 287-88.
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526 of the Tariff Act and decided that, in applying the common control
exception, Customs could interpret this language to allow importation of
gray market goods under section 526 of the Tariff Act. 35 The Court found
that the common control exception applies to gray market situations de-
scribed in the language of section 526 of the Tariff Act in which domestic
firms own a United States trademark for foreign-made goods and also are
a subsidiary of, a parent of, or the same as the foreign firm.3 6 The Supreme
Court found two ambiguities in this language of section 526. 37 First, the
Supreme Court reasoned that the language of section 526 dealing with the
ownership of a trademark does not discern whether the domestic subsidiary
or the foreign parent owned the United States trademark. 3 Second, the
Court found the wording of section 526 concerning the merchandise of
foreign manufacture to be ambiguous. 39 The Court explained that foreign
manufactured goods could mean goods manufactured in a foreign country,
goods manufactured by a foreign company, or goods manufactured in a
foreign country by a foreign company.40 Deferring to Customs' interpretation
of this ambiguous language, the Supreme Court upheld the common control
exception under section 526 of the Tariff Act. 41 Although the Supreme
Court upheld the common control exception under the language of section
526, the Court, without explanation, refused to decide the validity of the
35. Id. at 291.
36. Id. at 289-90. The Supreme Court in KMart first separated gray market cases into
three categories. Id. at 286-87. The first category involves a domestic company purchasing a
United States trademark from an independent foreign firm. Id. at 286. This category includes
situations in which the foreign firm already has registered the trademark in the United States
or in which the good has earned a reputation for quality. Id. The second category includes
domestic firms that own a United States trademark for foreign made goods and that are a
subsidiary of, a parent of, or the same as the foreign firm. Id. at 286-87. The common control
exception applies to this second category. Id. at 287. The third category consists of a domestic
firm authorizing the use of its trademark by an independent foreign company. Id. This
"authorized use" exception involves situations in which the domestic trademark owner sells
the exclusive right to use of the trademark to a foreign manufacturer and conditions this use
on the foreign company's promise not to import these trademarked goods into the United
States. Id. The Court sustained the regulations' application to the first and second categories
and invalidated the third category. Id. at 294.
37. See infra notes 38-42 and accompanying text (describing ambiguities in language of
§ 526 of Tariff Act). The relevant language of § 526(a) states:
[Ilt shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of foreign
manufacture if such merchandise ... bears a trademark owned by a citizen of, or
by a corporation or association created or organized within, the United States ...
unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is produced at the time of
making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988).
38. 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a) (1988) (speaking of trademark being "owned by" citizen of or
corporation organized within United States).
39. See KMart, 486 U.S. at 292-93 (interpreting phrase "merchandise of foreign manu-
facture" as applying to goods bearing United States trademark and prohibiting such goods
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common control exception under section 42 of the Lanham Act.
42
While the Supreme Court in KMart did not deal with section 42 of the
Lanham Act, the Second Circuit and the Third Circuit Courts have held
the common control exception valid under section 42 of the Lanham Act.
43
Focusing on the difficulties that Customs officials face in at-the-border
determinations of trademark infringement," these courts have given great
deference to Customs' interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act and
have upheld the common control exception as a valid interpretation of
section 42 of the Lanham Act. 4 Not all courts agree with the Second Circuit
and the Third Circuit however. 46 To hold the common control exception
valid in certain situations the United States Supreme Court and the United
States Court of International Trade have prohibited importation of gray
42. Id. at 290 n.3.
43. See Well Ceramics and Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 878 F.2d at 666-73 (3d Cir. 1989)
(holding that § 42 is no bar to importation of genuine gray market goods). Well Ceramics
involved a domestic trademark holder that was wholly owned by a foreign manufacturer. Id.
at 662. A third party was purchasing the trademarked goods in Europe and importing them
into the United States. Id. The domestic trademark holder sued the importer to stop the
importation of those gray market goods. Id. The Federal District Court for the District of
New Jersey held that the importation infringed the domestic trademark owner's trademark
pursuant to § 42 of the Lanham Act. Id. at 663. The foreign importer appealed, arguing that
neither § 526 of the Tariff Act nor § 42 of the Lanham Act bars importation in this situation
because of Customs' common control exception. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit, relying on
the United States Supreme Court's decision in KMart rejected the domestic trademark owner's
argument that § 526 of the Tariff Act did not allow importation. Id. at 664-66. The Third
Circuit then turned to the § 42 issue. Id. at 666-73. According to the Third Circuit, a domestic
trademark owner that is not independent of its foreign manufacturer and benefits from the
corporate relationship cannot prevent Customs from allowing importation under the common
control exception. Id. at 668. The Third Circuit found that because the foreign goods were of
equal quality, consumers purchasing the gray market goods were not injured. Id. at 672. Thus,
in Weil Ceramics the Third Circuit held that the common control exception does not violate
§ 42 of the Lanham Act if the domestic trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer are
the same company and the imported product is identical. Id. at 672-73. See also Olympus
Corp. v. United States, 792 F.2d 315, 319-21 (2d Cir. 1986) (limiting protection of § 42 to
nongenuine goods because Customs officials would be placed in precarious position of
determining when trademarks infringe domestic markholders' independent goodwill); supra,
note 32 (discussing facts and holding of Olympus); generally, Palladino, Gray Market Goods:
The United States Trademark Owners' View, 79 TRADEmA.x RaP. 159, 172 (1989) (discussing
facts and reasoning of Third Circuit in Weil Ceramics).
44. See Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320 (stating that one reason for Customs interpretation
of statutes allowing Customs to refuse to exclude goods is administrative difficulties inherent
in requiring Customs to make infringement determinations); supra note 32 (analyzing facts
and holding in Olympus).
45. See Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 104 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding
that unless Congress clearly expresses intent in statute, court must accept Customs interpretation
if reasonable); Olympus, 792 F.2d at 320 (stating "we believe that congressional acquiescence
in the long standing interpretation of the statute [§ 526] legitimates that interpretation as an
exercise of Customs enforcement discretion").
46. A. Bourjois & Co., Inc. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675, 676 (1922) (per curiam); In re
Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. 823, 832-33 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984); see also infra
notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing Aldridge and Alkaline Batteries).
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market goods under section 42 of the Lanham Act by focusing on certain
factors: 47 the promotion of competition, 48 the contractual relationships be-
tween the foreign and domestic companies, 49 and the confusion that impor-
tation of gray market goods can create among consumers. 50
Public policy also supports the validity of the common control exception,
but only, as the Supreme Court and Court of International Trade have
recognized, in certain situations. 5' Customs neither should permit nor pro-
hibit the importation of every gray market good. Although some public
policy reasons do exist for keeping the common control exception in its
current format, stronger public policy arguments suggest that Customs
should modify the exception.
5 2
Valid policy reasons for upholding the current common control excep-
tion include administrative deference and the feasibility of enforcing more
complex regulations." Customs has provided for and dealt with an exception
similar to the current common control exception for over fifty years.54 In
general, an administrative agency receives great deference from courts in
the agency's interpretation of statutory material.55 In addition, the legislative
history of section 42 of the Lanham Act speaks of the significance of an
administrative officer's determination on infringement. 56 The drafters equated
47. See Aldridge, 263 U.S. at 676 (1923) (per curiam), aff'g, 292 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir.
1922) (prohibiting importation of identical face powder that infringed United States trademark
and requiring Customs to exclude these goods from entry under predecessor to § 42 of Lanham
Act); In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 833 (following Aldridge by prohibiting
importation under § 42 of Lanham Act of genuine Belgian Duracell batteries that wholly
owned subsidiary of Duracell International, Inc. manufactured); generally, Palladino, Gray
Market Goods, supra note 43 at 170-74 (explaining history and analysis in Aldridge and
Duracell).
48. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 832.
49. Aldridge, 292 F. at 1014.
50. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 836.
51. See infra notes 80-141 and accompanying text (discussing situations in which Customs
should apply common control exception).
52. See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text (describing arguments for not altering
common control exception).
53. See infra notes 55-64 and accompanying text (discussing policy reasons for upholding
the current common control exception).
54. T.D. 48,537, 70 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 336, 336-38 (1936). Customs' first exception
to § 526 of the Tariff Act and to the predecessor of § 42 of the Lanham Act allowed
importation of goods if the United States trademark and foreign trademark were "owned by
the same person, partnership, association or corporation." Id. Customs expanded this exception
in 1953 to include trademark owners that were "related companies." 19 C.F.R. § 11.14 (1953),
T.D. 53,399, 88 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 376, 383-84 (1953). In 1959 Customs returned the
regulations to the language of the 1936 exception, allowing importation of trademarked goods
"owned by the same person, partnership, association or corporation." 19 C.F.R. § 11.14
(1959), T.D. 54,932, 94 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 433-34 (1959). See generally, Atwood, Import
Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise-The Role of the United States Bureau of Customs,
59 TRAD mARK REp. 301, 304-12 (1969) (discussing Bureau of Customs' interpretation of past
regulations and Customs' application of common control exception to affiliated companies).
55. See supra note 45 (discussing courts' respect for agency determinations).
56. Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Patents, S.R. 82, U.S. Senate, 78th
Cong., 2d Sess. 84, 89 (1944) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
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this determination to the issuance of a preliminary injunction by a competent
court57 and to the establishment of a prima facie case.58 Customs, as an
agency, and Customs officials, as individuals, have a working knowledge
of the gray market, and the Agency's interpretation merits respect. As a
result, both courts and legislators have given great deference to Customs'
interpretation of section 526 of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham
Act and, consequently, have upheld the common control exception. s9
Similarly, the feasibility of enforcing regulations concerning the gray
market favors deferring to Customs' interpretation of section 526 of the
Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham Act in formulating the common
control exception.60 As currently structured, the common control exception
does not give specific instructions about which corporate relationships fall
within the exception. 61 This vague directive means that Customs officials do
not have to monitor changing and complex multinational business relation-
ships, a task that a Customs law specialist recognized as completely futile.
62
The drafters of section 42 of the Lanham Act also were concerned with the
difficulty that Customs officials face in determining infringing trademarks.
63
The drafters suggested that courts, instead of Customs officials, should
make the initial determination of infringement under section 42 of the
Lanham Act." Section 42 of the Lanham Act and the common control
exception currently operate in this manner. 65 Changing the current common
control exception might require Customs officials to make a complex
determination of whether a good falls within the common control exception.
This added time and effort would compound the current difficulties that
Customs officials face because of the sheer volume of determinations these
officials must make each day." Customs officials have enforced the current
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See supra note 54-58 and accompanying text (discussing respect for agency determi-
nations).
60. See infra notes 61-67 (discussing administrative feasibility of Customs' regulations).
61. See supra notes 12-19 and accompanying text (describing language and application
of current common control exception).
62. Atwood, supra note 54, at 310-11. This author, a customs law specialist with the
United States Bureau of Customs, recognized the difficulty of discovering and understanding
continuous intentional and unintentional restructuring of corporations. Id.
63. Senate Hearings, supra note 56, at 82-83.
64. Id.
65. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988).
66. H.R. 621, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 1 (1977). In 1976 entries of goods requiring
infringement determinations by Customs officials numbered over three million. Id. This
represented a workload of 2,599 entries per import specialist per year, an increase of 74% per
specialist over 30 years. Id.
The United States Customs Service solicited requests concerning economic data on gray
market goods in 1984. 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453 (1984). However, Customs never performed a
compilation or analysis of the solicited data. Telephone Interview with Sam Orandie, Entry
Procedures and Penalties Division, Office of Regulations and Rulings, U.S. Customs Service,
Washington, D.C., Nov. 21, 1989. Instead Customs decided to resolve any gray market
controversies through litigation. Id.
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common control exception since 1978, and changes to the common control
exception would create significant problems in enforcement by Customs. 67
While the feasibility of enforcing Customs' regulations and the deference
due Customs' interpretation of section 526 of the Tariff Act and section 42
of the Lanham Act tend to validate the current common control exception,
stronger policy arguments point out the need for a modification of the
exception. 6 As presently structured and enforced, the common control
exception does not protect consumers or domestic trademark owners from
the harms that gray market goods can cause. 69 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia in Lever Brothers v. United States0 recently dealt
with one gray market situation that illustrates the inability of the current
common control exception to satisfy the important public policies of pro-
tecting consumers and domestic trademark owners.7'
Lever Brothers (Lever U.S.) manufactures Shield soap and Sunlight
dishwashing liquid in the United States.7 2 Lever Brothers, Ltd. (Lever U.K.)
also manufactures Shield and Sunlight but does so in the United Kingdom.
7 3
The Lever U.K. products differ from the United States products in ingre-
dients and performance, with each tailored to the specific tastes of its
country. 74 Third parties imported United Kingdom Shield and United King-
dom Sunlight into the United States without authorization from Lever U.S.,
and the Customs Service, citing the common control exception, refused to
block these importations. 75 Lever U.S. is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Unilever U.S., Inc., which is wholly owned by Unilever N.V., a Netherlands
corporation.76 Lever U.K. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Unilever, PLC
which also is owned by Unilever N.V.77 This affiliation means that Lever
U.S. and Lever U.K. are subject to common control. 78 In 1987 Lever U.S.,
to stop importation of the Lever U.K. products, sought a preliminary
injunction against Customs' use of the common control exception on the
grounds that the exception violated both section 526 of the Tariff Act and
section 42 of the Lanham Act. 79 The District of Columbia Circuit Court
67. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (discussing potential enforcement
problems of changing common control exception).
68. See infra notes 124-45 and accompanying text (arguing for modification of Customs'
common control exception).
69. See infra notes 94-123 and accompanying text (discussing protection needed for
consumers and domestic trademark owners).
70. 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
71. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1989); see infra
notes 72-85 and accompanying text (discussing Lever Bros).




76. Id. at 102 n.l.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 104. The D.C. Circuit's holding in Lever Bros. overturned the district court's
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interpreted section 42's protection against gray market goods to apply to
domestic manufacturers and invalidated the common control exception.80
Many factors involved in the Lever Brothers case highlight problems
that the current common control exception does not address.8' The theory
behind the common control exception is rooted in the treatment of the
domestic and foreign affiliates as a single trademark owner.82 Therefore,
under the common control exception, the foreign importer cannot infringe
upon the trademark of its domestic affiliate because Customs treats both
companies as owning the same trademark. 83 Consequently, while subject to
the common control exception, neither domestic nor foreign companies
effectively can control third party importation of gray market goods. 4
Physical differences in these gray market goods, such as the color and lather
of the Lever U.K. soap, cause consumer confusion and damage the goodwill
of the domestic manufacturer.8 5 If Customs permits importation of gray
market goods, the only remedy that firms such as Lever Bros. have is to
abandon the use of the trademark, a very costly alternative. 6
As Lever Brothers illustrates, the common control exception contradicts
the underlying goals of trademark law in certain situations.8 7 The United
States trademark laws have served two purposes since their inception.88 The
decision. Id. at 11l. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia had decided
Lever Bros. before the KMart decision and denied Lever U.S. relief under both § 526 of the
Tariff Act and § 42 of the Lanham Act. Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 652 F. Supp. 403,
406-07 (D.D.C. 1987). The district court in Lever Bros. found the earlier decision by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in COPIAT v. United States,
790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1986), that invalidated the common control exception under § 526 of
the Tariff Act, not to be binding because COPIAT's invalidation of Customs' common control
exception had been stayed, pending determination of the petition for certiorari. Lever Bros.
Co., 652 F. Supp. at 405. The district court relied on the decisions in Vivitar and Olympus
and deferred to Customs' interpretation of § 526 of the Tariff Act and § 42 of the Lanham
Act. Id. at 406-07. Lever Bros. based their claim on § 42 of the Lanham Act after the United
States Supreme Court's decision in KMart, which upheld the validity of the common control
exception under § 526 of the Tariff Act. Lever Bros. Co, 877 F.2d at 104 n.6; see supra notes
23-42 and accompanying text (summarizing Supreme Court's decision in KMart).
80. Lever Bros. Co., 877 F.2d at 11l. In Lever Bros. the Court of Appeals' announced
a tentative holding, reversing and remanding the case to the district court for further findings
on the legislative history. Id.
81. See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text (showing factors that Customs' common
control exception does not address).
82. Lever Bros. Co., 877 F.2d at 109.
83. Id.
84. Id. at Ill.
85. Id. at 110.
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text (discussing Lever Bros. as one situation
that common control exception ignores).
88. See Trade Mark Act, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881) (dealing with trademark infringement
and providing for bar on importation of watches and watch parts that copy or simulate the
trademark of domestic manufacturer). The language of § 42 dealing with trademark infringe-
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Lanham Act and its predecessors first have sought to protect consumers
from infringing trademarks. 89 To determine if a trademark is infringing,
Customs officials judge whether the mark is likely to cause the public to
associate the copying mark with the recorded mark. 90 Second, Congress, by
drafting section 42 of the Lanham Act to prohibit importation of marks
that copy or simulate a registered trademark and marks that induce the
public to believe that the article is manufactured in the United States,
attempted to protect trademark owners' investments of time, energy, and
money in establishing their trademarks. 9 However, the common control
exception's basic assumption of treating foreign and domestic companies as
a single trademark holder furthers the goals of trademark law only if the
imported goods are identical to the domestic goods and only if the affiliated
company imports the goods.92 Such a situation rarely arises.93
Importation of nonidentical gray market goods harms consumers in a
variety of ways.94 Nonidentical gray market goods often are inferior in
quality to their domestic counterparts. 9 Gray market goods may not meet
ment states:
[N]o article of imported merchandise which shall copy or simulate the name of the
[sic] any domestic manufacture ... or which shall copy or simulate a trademark
registered in accordance with the provisions of this chapter or shall bear a name or
mark calculated to induce the public to believe that the article is manufactured in
the United States ... shall be admitted to entry at any customhouse of the United
States ...
15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988). Congress originally used this same language in the Trade Mark Act
of 1905. See Trade Mark Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 724 (1905); infra notes
83-85 and accompanying text (listing two underlying purposes of Lanham Act).
89. Arguments before Comm. on Patents, H.R. 5349 and H.R. 10091, House of Rep.,
58th Cong. 7 (1906). The drafters of the Tariff Act of 1905 recognized a concern for trademark
owners and consumers because, with trademark infringement, consumers receive goods that
they did not order and that most often were of inferior quality. Id. The drafters further noted
that the inferior quality of foreign goods coupled with reduced prices perpetuated the desire
for and the profitability of trademark infringement. Id.; S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946) (stating first purpose of trademark statute is to protect public so it may be
confident that it will get product that it asks for and wants to get), reprinted in 1946 U.S.
CODE CoNo. SERV. 1274 [hereinafter Senate Report].
90. R. STuRM, 7 CusToMs LAW & ADMUMsTRATION § 12.6, at 49 (3d ed. 1989).
91. 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1988); see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 89, at 1274 (stating
second purpose of trademark statute is to protect goodwill of domestic trademark owners).
The investment that a trademark owner spends to make the public aware of the product,
through the association of a trademark, constitutes goodwill. J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKs AND
UNFAm ComI'EmoN, §§ 2.7-2.8 (2d ed. 1984).
92. See supra notes 65-84 and accompanying text (discussing Lever Bros. as illustration
of need for modification of common control exception and exploring relationship between
underlying goals of trademark law and common control exception).
93. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which third parties
imported nonidentical gray market goods).
94. See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (illustrating ways in which gray market
goods harm consumers).
95. See infra notes 98-104 and accompanying text (explaining lower quality of gray
market goods).
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United States safety standards, and these goods may not have warranties. 96
Finally, consumers may not be buying what they think they are buying.
97
The Customs regulations contain no standards for the quality of goods
imported under the common control exception.9s Goods may be of lower
quality because of poor storage, 99 poor handling, 100 or poor production. 10'
Goods also may differ if the goods are manufactured in a foreign country
and explicitly designed for that country's tastes.1 02 Additionally, gray market
goods may not meet domestic safety requirements because neither the
domestic manufacturer nor the distributor inspects these goods. 03 For
example, the Shield soap imported by the foreign owner in Lever Bros.
contained ingredients that the Food and Drug Administration has not
approved. 104
Even if the quality and safety of gray market goods matches that of
the domestic goods, a lack of servicing or warranty on these goods can
harm consumers. Consumers who purchase gray market goods that need
repair or replacement may not receive proper service if the gray market
seller does not warrant the goods. 05 Consumers then are stuck with broken
or below-average products.
96. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing warranty issues of gray market
goods).
97. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text (exploring how gray market goods
confuse consumers).
98. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1989).
99. See Note, Vivitar v. United States: Protection Against Gray Market Goods Under
19 U.S.C. Section 1526, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 179, 191 (1986) (discussing ways in which gray
market goods harm consumers). If products, such as batteries, are fragile or have a tendency
to deteriorate, Customs should compare the distribution network of the domestic producer to
the network of the foreign gray market importer. Id. If the foreign importer's distribution
network causes a greater likelihood of damaged goods, courts should be reluctant to allow
importation. Id.
100. Id. An example of goods that require special handling can be found in Adolph Coors
Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 131 (D.Colo. 1980), in which distributors'
mishandling of beer caused beer to decrease in quality. Id.
101. See Note, supra note 99, at 191. A discount gray market seller of low quality goods
may not have an incentive to improve the quality of goods because consumers expect and pay
for this lower quality. Id. at 192.
102. See Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 102 (involving soap and dishwashing liquid made in
England for English tastes and subsequently imported into the United States); supra notes 70-
86 and accompanying text (discussing facts and holdings in Lever Bros.).
103. See Note, supra note 99, at 193 (describing potential harms of gray market goods
that lack proper safety inspections). If goods pose health or safety risks, a lack of instructions
or warnings could result in injuries to domestic consumers. Id. If a product is complex,
consumers need an instruction manual to properly use the product. Id. The nonexistence or
incomprehensibility of safety warnings or instructions would give courts reason to enjoin
importation of these goods. Id.
104. APPENDIX at 63, Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(stating FDA had not certified colorants in foreign Shield soap).
105. See Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Granada Elecs., Inc., 816 F.2d 68 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding domestic trademark owner could prevent sale of imported Cabbage Patch
dolls accompanied by instructions and adoption papers written in Spanish); Osawa & Co. v.
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Perhaps the most common detriment gray market goods cause consumers
is confusion. When buying Shield soap, consumers expect the product to
be the same soap they have purchased in the past.1 06 Products that turn out
to be different or not under warranty frequently baffle consumers. The
consumers often believe that the domestic trademark owner is responsible
even though the product contains the foreign trademark and indicates the
foreign place of origin.'0 7 Importation of nonidentical gray market goods
based on the common control exception harms consumers by ignoring quality
and safety standards that contribute to consumer confusion.
In addition to harming consumers, importation of nonidentical gray
market goods harms domestic trademark owners' advertising, sales, and
business reputations.101 One major vehicle of establishing a trademark is
through advertising. Domestic trademark owners spend large amounts of
money in the United States to develop a product's reputation.' °9 For
example, over a period of seven years the domestic manufacturer in Lever
Brothers spent approximately $423 million to advertise and promote its soap
and detergent products."10 Gray market goods bearing a similar trademark
receive a free ride on the domestic trademark owner's advertising. This free
ride on advertisement and promotion can lead to a decline in a domestic
company's sales."' Lever U.S. has claimed lost sales of over $5 billion on
its Shield and Sunlight products due to the importation of an affiliate's
gray market goods.112 Customers of these products purchase the foreign
B & H Photo, 589 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (enjoining discount camera dealers
from importing photographic equipment bearing identical trademarks of plaintiff's domestic
equipment). See generally Palladino, supra note 43, at 161-66 (discussing genuine goods issues
in Osawa and Original Appalachian Artworks).
106. Appendix, supra note 104, at 204-05, (setting forth letter from consumer). The
consumer purchased Shield soap at a discount drug store. Id. at 204. The consumer used the
soap, which turned her washcloth green. Id. After noticing that the address on the package
was from England, the consumer wrote to Lever U.S. questioning quality of the U.K. Shield.
Id. at 205. Products that turn out to be different or not under warranty frequently baffle
consumers. The consumers often believe that the domestic trademark owner is responsible even
though the product contains the foreign trademark and indicates the foreign place of origin.
107. APPENDIX, supra note 104, at 197 (reprinting consumer letter). A customer, thinking
U.S. Shield had new packaging, bought U.K. Shield. Id. After using the U.K. Shield, the
consumer noticed an unpleasant smell and wrote to Lever U.S. to express her dissatisfaction.
Id. The consumer did notice the English address on the package but thought that Lever U.S.
might "formulate differently for the British market." Id.
108. See infra notes 109-23 and accompanying text (describing gray market harms to
domestic trademark owners).
109. See Baldo, Score One for the Gray Market, Forbes, Feb. 25, 1985, at 74 (stating
that Duracell spent $150 million over three years promoting its batteries in the United States).
Gray market goods are a hot topic in the political sphere. Id. Politicians calling for exclusion
of gray market goods that are now allowed under the common control exception are labeled
protectionists, and their opponents call for a position promoting free trade. Id.
110. APPENDIX, supra note 104, at 59-60.
111. See supra notes 107-09 and accompanying text (discussing ways in which gray market
imports decrease domestic sales).
112. APPENDIX, supra note 104, at 244.
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gray market goods believing that these goods are the domestic soap and
detergent and, if disappointed by the quality or performance of the gray
market goods, switch to a competing brand.' Because gray market goods
often are less expensive than the domestic products, distributors sell more
of the foreign manufactured goods, and thereby decrease purchases of the
domestic trademark owner's good. The distributors also cancel participation
in the domestic trademark owner's promotional campaigns.
' 4
Perhaps the most subjective, yet the most severe harm to domestic
trademark owners is the damage to business reputation.'" If a gray market
good is of inferior quality, the consumer likely will blame the domestic
trademark owner simply because of the name on the package. 1 6 Even if
the consumer knows that the product comes from the foreign gray market
producer, the consumer may refuse to purchase the domestic trademark
owner's product again because of the risk that the product will be inferior." 
7
The domestic trademark owner loses not only its immediate market share,
but also future sales as a result of its diminished business reputation.
In addition to the problems of consumer confusion and of domestic
trademark owners' losses of money and goodwill, multinational corporations
can avoid Customs' application of the current common control exception
through corporate restructuring."' For Customs to exclude gray market
goods under section 526 of the Tariff Act and section 42 of the Lanham
Act, domestic affiliates of international companies must be separately
owned. 19 Otherwise, the common control exception allows importation.'20
Multinational enterprises are beginning to restructure corporate relationships
between domestic and foreign affiliates exclusively for the purpose of
requiring Customs to exclude gray market goods from the United States.'
2'
113. Id.
114. Id. at 243-44.
115. See Note, supra note 99, at 192-94 (discussing economic harm to business reputation
and analogizing to advertising theory).
116. ApproNix, supra note 104, at 209-10 (reprinting consumer letter to Lever U.S.). In
Lever Bros. a consumer wrote Lever U.S. to express dissatisfaction with U.K. Shield soap.
Id. The consumer noticed the soap was from a Lever U.S. affiliate in England but nonetheless
blamed Lever U.S. for the lower quality. Id. The consumer wrote, "I think if the product is
so different, it is up to you, the manufacturer, to prevent sales or label clearly that the product
is different." Id.
117. See APPENDiX, supra note 104, at 197 (discussing letter from consumer noticing fine
print displaying British origin but suggesting that consumer would not buy even Lever U.S.
Shield again).
118. See infra notes 119-23 and accompanying text (discussing costs corporations incur
when restructuring to avoid application of common control exception).
119. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text (explaining relationship between trade-
mark statutes and common control exception).
120. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (defining application of common
control exception).
121. See Steiner & Sabath, Intellectual Property and Trade Law Approaches to Gray
Market Importation and the Restructuring of Transnational Entities to Permit Blockage of
Gray Goods in the United States, 15 Wm. MrrcHELL L. Rv. 433, 440-42 (1989) (describing
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This "end run" around the trademark laws demonstrates how tenuous the
relationship between corporate affiliation and trademark infringement is
with respect to the current common control exception. Corporate restruc-
turing can result in the exclusion of some gray market imports that do not
harm consumers or domestic trademark owners.12 For example, in a situ-
ation in which the gray market good is of equal quality, warranted by the
foreign company, sold at a lower price, and identified with the foreign
manufacturer, a domestic trademark owner still could block importation
solely by restructuring the international corporation to avoid the common
control exception.'13
The current common control exception, which allows importation of
gray market goods based solely on corporate affiliation, causes consumer
confusion and harms domestic trademark owners.124 Customs should modify
the common control exception to eliminate these harms. One proposal that
would reduce the problems associated with the current common control
exception would be the modification of the common control exception to
allow firms under the actual control of the affiliated company to import
identical, warranted gray market goods. Importation of these gray market
goods would provide consumers with a reliable and cheaper alternative' 21
and, consequently, would prevent domestic companies from setting artifi-
cially high prices in the United States market.
2 6
Supporters of the current common control exception will question the
feasibility of such modifications because of the difficulty that Customs
officials would face in making infringement determinations. 2 7 Limiting the
common control exception to identical gray market goods would require
Customs officials to make a comparison of the domestic product and the
situations in which international corporations have and could have restructured to avoid
importation of gray market goods under Customs common control exception). An example of
corporate restructuring to avoid the application of the current common control exception
includes an international corporation assigning ownership rights of United States trademark
to an independent United States distributor that already had established goodwill in connection
with the gray market goods. Id. at 441. Another example involved the creation of a foreign
umbrella entity which owned the United States marketing operation and the United States
trademark and that sold the gray market goods in the United States. Id. In both these examples,
Customs blocked importation of the gray market goods. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 94-123 and accompanying text (discussing harms that gray market
goods cause to consumers and domestic trademark owners).
125. See Appendix, supra note 104, at 243-44 (stating that gray market Shield soap and
Sunlight detergent are sold at lower prices than domestic counterpart); Baldo, Score One for
the Gray Market, Forbes, Feb. 25, 1985, at 74 (estimating consumers save 20-30% when
purchasing gray market goods). But see In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, supra note 46, at 826
(finding retailers sold gray market batteries at same price as domestic batteries).
126. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text (discussing gray market goods'
economic impact on domestic corporations).
127. See infra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing feasibility of modification
of common control exception).
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gray market good at the time of importation.'2 While this comparison may
increase the time spent on infringement determinations, Customs officials'
exclusion of nonidentical gray market goods, even if imported by an
affiliated foreign company, would decrease the harm and confusion that
nonidentical gray market goods cause to consumers.
1 29
Even if Customs can determine the quality of gray market goods by an
objective comparison with domestic counterparts, Customs officials also
must decide when a domestic and foreign company are subject to common
control. 30 As currently enforced, the Customs regulations do not elicit
enough information about companies' corporate structures to make a mean-
ingful decision about whether to apply the common control exception.'
However, if Customs revises the regulations to require domestic trademark
owners to provide more information about corporate structure, production
control, and marketing strategy, the common control exception would
become a more effective tool for determining trademark infringement. A
domestic trademark owner that shares only a tenuous relationship with an
affiliated foreign importer could provide Customs with enough information
to exempt the gray market goods from the common control exception and
effectively ban importation.3 2 Domestic companies should be willing to
supply Customs with this information rather than face the vacillating
determination under the current common control exception. These revisions
of Customs regulations would allow importation of gray market goods when
importation best serves the interests of consumers and domestic trademark
owners. 3
A second proposal, short of excluding all gray market goods, is inform-
ative labeling or demarking.'1 4 This process would include either a disclaimer
on the gray market package or provide for the eradication of the gray
128. See BRIEF FOR APPEuLEE at 14, Lever Bros. Co. v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (arguing that Customs officials cannot make infringement decisions at border that
require factual determination of quality and goodwill).
129. Id. at 29 (stating that Customs does not have to make determination of goodwill if
both gray market importer and domestic trademark owner manufacture goods because gray
market good has no independent goodwill).
130. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (detailing process of applying Customs'
common control exception).
131. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (1985).
132. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing corporate relationship
involved in Lever Bros.).
133. See supra notes 124-29 and accompanying text (explaining benefits to consumers and
trademark owners resulting from modification of common control exception).
134. See Palladino, supra note 43, at 199-200 (giving another treatment of labeling versus
exclusion of gray market goods); Sandier, Gray Market Good: The Controversy Will Continue,
13 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 267, 274 (1987) (discussing considerations involved in labeling or
demarking of gray market goods). In discussions of informative labeling or demarking, courts
and commentators stress the importance of a consumer's identification of a trademark. Sandier,
supra, at 274. Demarking or labeling will not reduce the likelihood of consumer confusion
regarding gray market goods because the product packaging is similar or identical and the
public often focuses solely on the trademark. Palladino, supra, at 199.
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market trademark from the package. 35 Some courts have encouraged this
method because labeling or demarking informs the consumer that the goods
do not come from the domestic trademark owner. 36 Consumers still may
choose to purchase gray market goods of inferior quality or gray market
goods without warranties if the consumers decide that the lower prices
outweigh the risks associated with the gray market goods.
13 7
However, problems with labeling or demarking still exist.138 Consumers
may not notice or understand the label, making an unconscious decision to
purchase a lower quality or an unwarranted product. 39 Consumers who
purchase labeled gray market goods may not comprehend the gray market
situation and, consequently, may place the blame for any dissatisfaction on
the domestic trademark owner. 40 Demarking of a gray market trademark
also does not help consumers because, without a trademark, consumers do
not know what they are purchasing.
A third proposal, already in effect in New York,141 would allow im-
portation of gray market goods but require retailers of gray market goods
to post signs informing customers that these goods lack warranties or other
features. 42 Violation of this law would result in a fine on the retailer and
the opportunity for the customer to return the merchandise within a limited
time. ' 41 Implementing this proposal would relieve the burden on Customs
for making infringement determinations and increase the responsibility on
the faction that encourages and promotes gray market importation, the
retailers.
While this proposal would give some protection to consumers, difficul-
ties similar to those incurred in informative labeling and demarking still
would exist.'4 Consumers' ignorance or disregard of the signs would make
135. Palladino, supra note 43, at 199.
136. See Note, supra note 99, at 204-05 (discussing cases requiring competitors to label
competing goods). The United States Supreme Court allowed importation of gray market face
powder containing labels that plainly stated foreign products were not connected with domestic
products. Prestonnettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 369 (1924). The Supreme Court also
permitted trademark use on second-hand sparkplugs as long as the labels revealed that the
plugs were used. Champion Sparks Plugs, 331 U.S. 125, 132 (1947).
137. See Note, supra note 99, at 204-05 (discussing consumer considerations in purchasing
gray market goods).
138. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text (discussing drawbacks to labeling or
demarking).
139. See supra notes 106-07 (discussing reactions and motives of consumers to foreign
and domestic products at issue in Lever Bros.).
140. See supra notes 115-17 (relating letters from consumers who blamed dissatisfaction
with gray market goods on domestic trademark owner).
141. See Imports Without Warranty, N.Y. Times, June 22, 1985, at 52, col. 1 (reporting
substance of New York gray market law requiring retailers to post signs). The purpose of the
New York legislation is to force merchants to accept the responsibility of informing consumers
about gray market goods. Id. A spokesman for the Department of Consumer Affairs observed
that "just telling people verbally that they are gray market goods just won't cut it." Id.
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on labeling).
144. Id.
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retailers' signs ineffective, and consumers nevertheless might blame domestic
trademark owners for problems with purchases of gray market goods.' 4 In
addition, implementing a national sign-posting requirement for retailers
would result in enormous expenses not only for the retailers, but also for
the government, which would have to setup, maintain, and enforce this
law.
Of the three proposed modifications mentioned, a rewriting of the
common control exception that elicits relevant and specific information
about related companies is preferable to informative labeling either at the
border or in the marketplace,' 46 primarily because informative labeling may
not eliminate the consumer confusion or the warranty problems that gray
- market goods may cause. 147 Customs should except gray market goods from
the general prohibitions on importation in section 526 of the Tariff Act
and section 42 of the Lanham Act only if the foreign goods are identical
to their domestic counterparts, if the foreign affiliates warrant the gray
market goods, and if the domestic trademark owner and the foreign affiliate
truly share control over production, distribution, and servicing. 48 The
current common control exception recognizes the importance of permitting
importation of gray market goods if the goods originate from a single
source and have a single trademark. 49 However, as Lever Bros. illustrates,
affiliates of modern multinational corporations do not fit easily into the
common control exception. 50 Customs should modify the current common
control exception to better reflect the trademark law's policy of protecting
consumers and domestic trademark owners.' 5' Customs should make an
intensive inquiry into the nature of the affiliated companies' corporate
relationship and permit importation only of gray market goods that will
not confuse consumers or damage the goodwill of domestic manufacturers.1
2
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145. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text (detailing current common control
exception).
146. See supra notes 124-45 and accompanying text (discussing three proposals for
modifying common control exception).
147. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (describing difficulties with informative
labeling).
148. See supra notes 124-33 and accompanying text (explaining first proposal for modi-
fication of current common control exception).
149. See supra notes 12-22 and accompanying text (setting out background and application
of common control exception in gray market).
150. See supra notes 72-86 and accompanying text (illustrating difficulties in applying
common control exception to corporate relationship in Lever Bros).
151. See supra notes 88-93 (discussing underlying purposes of § 526 of Tariff Act and
§ 42 of Lanham Act).
152. See supra notes 94-133 and accompanying text (discussing harms gray market good
can cause and suggesting modification of current common control exception).
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